

## An Account of the Debate in Town, &amp;c.

## LETTER III.

*Against the Partition Treaty.*

S I R,

I Have received Yours, and find what I expected; that you are mightily pleas'd with Mr P. he is warmly for a Peace, and lashes the Court, and that's enough to make him your Favourite.

I left Yesterday with Mr. R. whom I fear you will not like so well; for he is the Reverse of the other, eager for a War, and in his Place, tho not in his Judgment, for the Court. I left with him Copies of the two Letters, and desir'd him to have his Reasons for a War, and his Answer to Mr. P. in readiness: For the one without the other would rather perplex than determine you.

This Day we met, but he told me he was afraid we must take another time. For Mr. S. said he, whom I perceive you know, and who is but gone to the next Room, has fallen upon me for the Partition Treaty. He left us in the last Parliament, and joined with the other Party; yet he's an honest Man, tho warm, which is my fault too, and I think the Disease of honest Men. However, I hope he'll join with us, and be for War. Let us hear him patiently if you please. The *Partition Treaty* (said I) is the present Subject of Debate; I'll give it the preference with all my heart: And your Friend in the Country, said Mr. R. will be at no loss; for after what is writ already for War I can but repeat: nor is there now any more arguing in Town upon that Subject. The Matter stands, as Mr. P. states it; a War is yielded to be necessary, and sticks not at want of Money, or

loss of Trade, which he did not insist on; but at a Remedy for no Conduct, Toolship and Eclipses, &c. Could Men forget the management of the last War, and hope for a better, we should be all of a Mind; but there's the Difficulty.

Since Mr. S. stays so long, I'll resume in the mean time how far we had gone: He begun his Discourse, that I and the other Place-Whigs (as he calls us) were resolved to maintain the Wisdom, or at least the honesty of the *Partition Treaty*, in order to save the Grand Partitioner, and to make our Courts; and that some one or other of us was the Author of the Letter to a Member of Parliament in *December* last, in favour of that Treaty; which Letter he said, tho writ with all the Art and Beauty imaginable; and in which all is said that can be said for the Treaty, instead of proscribing him and others, has confirm'd them in their Detestation of it. For, said he, if such Painting, such Softness, such engaging Insinuations with all the Turns and Colours that could be thought on, cannot cover the Deformity of it; how ugly must it look if it be exposed naked to the Eye of the World? How weak and desperate a Cause must it be, continued he, that forc'd so excellent a Pen, to have recourse to Artifice, to Disingenuity, to Prevarication: Nay (which is harder for a Man of Sense) to trifling and contradicting himself, tho he had nothing to deal with but the weakness of his Cause, or a more favourable Adversary, one of his own framing. So far Mr. S. had proceeded, and was just going to let

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a-loose

a-loose at the Treaty. When he was call'd for, I own he surpriz'd me with some Instances he gave of the weakness of the Letter; for to tell you the truth, it had charm'd me. It's true, I had read it but once, and in haste. Upon this Mr. S. coming in, I told him that I was inform'd of what had pass'd, and hop'd my Company would not hinder him from going on.

Then, said he, to loose no time, I'll begin with an Instance of gross Prevarication in this Matter. To take People off from the Pursuit of the Treaty, and give them a false scent of all that has happen'd is imputed not to the Treaty, but to the Breach of it. The Perfidy of the French is exaggerated for having lost to Europe the Blessings of so valuable a Bargain. Whereas the Treaty, tho it had not begot the Will, or that the French had not accepted the Will, would alone, if executed, have ruin'd Europe by undoing the Ballance of it: But the Prevarication lies here; they conceal the secret Article with the Emperour, for maintaining his Right to the Succession of Spain, upon which chiefly he came into the Business of the Revolution. Could any thing less than the securing that Succession to his Family, have made so Catholick a Prince as he is join in the throwing out of a zealous Catholick King, and in the destroying the hopes and prospect of settling again that Religion in these three Kingdoms.

Thus without shame they upbraid France, or are willing to seem to do it with breach of Faith; tho they are conscious, that by their Partition they are guilty of a more inexcusable violation of it to the Emperour, than the French by accepting the Will, are to them.

The Article was a Bargain, and we were paid for it: If we recede from it we should at least make Restitution. But the Partition was in pure Complement to France, if we may believe Count Briord, who tells us, that we stipulated nothing to our selves in it; and as France might have declin'd to accept of our Complement; why, may they not renounce that which was done

singly as a Favour to them, if they can do better. Or after all, if there was a Secret Treaty; (for Briord speaks only of the publick one, and a secret one there was) as the Letter shews, (p. 10.) or a secret understanding with something at bottom, some return for so much Love and Kindness which uses to be mutual, for securing to France upon all Events Lorrain, Naples, Sicily, &c. an Equivalent for the Loss of the Ballance of Europe, and the loss of all Honour and Reputation. If this be the Case, which I pray God it may not be; and if France be still willing to make good their part, to make good to us this Secret this Equivalent; sure we cannot well complain that they have made no further use of the Favour we did them by the Partition, than to compass the Will with it. The Article I have mentioned is one of the two secret Articles (*Separati Articuli*) belonging to the Grand Alliance of 89; and which my Lord ---- your Friend will no doubt call for, if he advert to it. For he still speaks English, notwithstanding the Contagion of other Languages. We have, (said Mr. R.) an Answer that takes off the strength of this. Pardon me, replied Mr. S. if I doubt it. I never knew an Object so industriously conceal'd when there was a good Answer to be given to it; but you shall be heard; let me go on now.

The next thing I charge the Managers of this Debate with, is manifest Disingenuity in stating it; as if there had been a Necessity of having either the Partition, or the Will, in order to have a handle to extol the Partition as preferable to the Will. Whereas the Truth of the Matter is, there was no Necessity for either of them; but on the contrary, both might, and ought to have been shun'd or prevented, as being both pernicious, because both infer the loss of the Ballance of Europe: Nor are they otherwise to be compared, than as two Diseases equally mortal, of which one kills sooner, and the other later.

But what had Europe to do with any mortal killing thing? What had we to do after the Peace, but to renew the Confede-

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facy upon the received Original Foot ? The  
 true Bond and Center of Union, I mean  
 the preserving the Ballance of *Europe*, by  
 preventing the growth of *France*, whether  
 by Wills or Partitions, or any other manner  
 of way. Were we instead of this to abandon  
 the true Interest of *Europe*, our own  
 Interest, the Interest of Religion and Liber  
 ty, the Glory of our Family and Cause :  
 To abandon our old Friends and Confede  
 rates, and to enter into Treaties and Friend  
 ships with the Enemies of *Europe*, our own  
 inveterate Enemies and Assassins, who were  
 already engaged (as much as we cou'd fair  
 ly engage them) by the 4th Article of the  
*Treaty of Reswick, to assassinate no more.*  
 Treaties contrary to divine and humane  
 Laws for the disposing of that which we  
 had no Right to dispose of, contrary to our  
 Faith given, and to the common Rules of  
 Honour and Humanity ; since it was a dis  
 posing of the Inheritance of a Friend, and  
 of a living Friend, which even the Heathens  
 wou'd have made void in Law, as contain  
 ing *Votum captandæ mortis alienæ.* Accord  
 ingly God has blasted all, and we are now  
 in shame and burden even to our selves.  
 How dar'd the Grand Partitioner by his  
 criminal Conferences and Embassy, bring  
 his Master into such a Bargain ? Can he an  
 swer for it either to God or Man ? *A Mas*  
*ter, whose great Glory it is to have main*  
*tain'd these 30 years with Hope against*  
*Hope, and his sword, the Ballance of Eu*  
*rope.* Is he made to give it up *with the*  
*dash of a Pen ?* And so kind a Master too  
 thus used, who since the Revolution hath  
 given him, a drudg of a Servant, for tri  
 ling and whispering, for spoiling Business,  
 and bringing Clamour on the Dutch, that  
 which barring Resumptions wou'd have  
 prov'd, or will prove, more than his  
 old Masters the States had for venturing  
 their Army and Fleet to compass it. Yet it  
 seems all this must go for nothing ; he will  
 needs have his Revenges even for Looks  
 that go elsewhere, no Partition here, no  
 thing less than the entire Will, a Monopo  
 ly of Favour can satiate the insatiable  
 French waspish Thing ; who, if these Na

tions be undone, has undone them, his  
 own Master, and his own Country to the  
 bargain.

Pray, said Mr. R. now that you'r almost  
 out of Breath, tell me calmly what's the  
 Quarrel you have all with him. Mr. P.  
 too was constantly at him. Why, replied  
 Mr. S. no private Quarrel I assure you,  
 but the publick one : And to convince you  
 of this, provided he'll do one thing to  
 save us, and which it's in his Power to do,  
 I'll engage that Mr. P. and I shall contri  
 bute for a Statue to him. Lord ! replied  
 Mr R. what can that thing be which he can  
 do to save us, and please you ? It is said  
 Mr. S. barely, to let us know the Secret of  
 the Partition, the depth of such infamous  
 Friendship with *France* ; it's a Jest to think  
 we have done so much for nothing, had we  
 been sworn Brothers bred together, and the  
 Ties of Inclination fortified by a long train  
 of mutual good Offices : What cou'd we  
 have done more for *France* than we have  
 done, since the Peace ? Well, supposing all  
 this true, said Mr. R. and that he proving  
 as bad one way, as you have made him ano  
 ther, shou'd discover it ; how wou'd the  
 Discovery save us ? Why, answers Mr. S.  
 we should know where we are, and upon  
 what Ground we stand, and what Measures  
 to take if we were once convinc'd that the  
 fatal Charm is over, which we can never  
 be unless we know it. But to proceed :

My third Objection is to the manner of  
 that Treaty. They seem to yield, that the  
 Foundation of it was laid at the Conferen  
 ces. They hope thus to render it plausible  
 and necessary, as if the Peace, or at least  
 so good a Peace, could not have been had  
 without it ; but this cannot be so, for its  
 known the same offers had been made long  
 before the Conferences, and whatever *France*  
 got by the Conferences, the Confederates  
 got nothing by them but Misunderstanding  
 and Disunion. However, supposing what they  
 pretend, that a Partition was consented to  
 at the Conferences ; here is Dishonour and  
 breach of Faith in the very Foundation ; for  
 by the Grand Alliance nothing was to be  
 treated of, even in order to a Peace, with  
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out the Knowledg and Concurrence of the other Confederates; and much less for dividing the Succession of *Spain*, which we were to preserve entire to the Emperour.

Add here, that the Treaty, as it was begun without the Confederates, so it was carried on without the Concurrence and Advice of any English-man. I do not call ones bare signing, as a Foot-man does a Bond, when his Master orders him to be Witness to it, Concurrence and Advice: Nor do I reckon the Communication and Knowledg of this Treaty when resolved on, or the other Forms, to be Concurrence and Advice. I desire to know of you Mr. R. if ever the Draught of this Treaty was brought into any English Council, Cabinet, or Committee; and there after Deliberation and Debate approv'd of by them; if it was, it's more than I know, and I'm sure more than is usual. For to say a thing has pass'd in the Cabinet, is only to say, that it was told, or communicated to the Cabinet; and that none there oppos'd it. And why *should* they? Would you have Men of breeding so unmannerly as to oppose what's resolv'd on, and which comes to them only for Form's sake, or as to the Top-news-mongers of the Nation, in order, I suppose, to publish it: For what else have they to do with what they are not to deliberate on? Now if this be the Case, as I doubt it is, how can it be call'd an English Treaty? which if one English Man's Hand be at it, yet no English Man's Head (to speak so) is concern'd in it; nor consequently liable to answer for it. Thus insensibly the great Security of our Constitution is lost; which was, that nothing of Importance cou'd be done, but by English Councils, who were to answer to the Nation at their Peril for what they advis'd.

But to finish this Point. The Treaty thus begun and carried on, was concluded in time of Parliament; whose Advice (one wou'd think) since it's taken in smaller Matters, might have been ask'd in one of such high Importance without any Diminution of the Prerogative: The Prerogative of making Treaties, and Peace; and

War, has its Bounds. There can be nothing unlimited in a limited Government but the Legislative or *Salus populi*: But what those Bounds are I shall not pretend to determine, that belongs to another place, and there I'll tell my Opinion. But one thing is obvious, that it's a Contradiction to pretend that my Person and Estate are my Property, that cannot be touch'd without my Consent; and yet I can whether I will or not, be brought into a War, in which I may loose both. If so, *Magna Charta* deserves the Name that has been given it.

It's true, said Mr. R. but pray consider that you have the Purse, and the Government has only the Sword; which without the other, as War is now managed, signifies nothing. You see even Victories amount to little. The heaviest Purse decides the Quarrel at last. But suppose now, replied Mr. S. a King angry with his People, and that to be revenged on them, he would make a War without the Purse, or do it to make them open the Purse: as you may remember a Governour of *Flanders* was directed to declare War, and did it against *France* with 5000 Men, to vex the Dutch and others, and forc'd them to the Purse into a War, which they had no mind to. Did the Sword here without the other signify nothing? Thus there may be Cases, in which the two may disagree, and in which the Sword will get the better, as it daily happens on the High-way, where the Decision of the Quarrel betwixt the Sword and the Purse is natural and downright against you.

I shall add but one thing more upon this Head, which is, that supposing the Prerogative to enter into Treaties, and to make Peace or War, ever so absolute: Still you'll agree that *St. Paul* had as absolute a Prerogative to act for the Truth; and yet he tells you he cou'd do nothing against it. Sure then this Grand Prerogative of our King can only extend to Treaties for the good of *England*, and not to Treaties that tend to the ruin of *England*, and of all *Europe*. Or if you like as *Eldeniana*, my Lady *Kent's* Cook-maid (if I remember right



had the Power of seasoning, but not the Power of poisoning. In short, the Prerogative may suffer upon the account of this Treaty, but this Treaty can never be justified by the Prerogative.

It's now high time to hear what your Friend, the Author of the Letter has to say to all this. In doing which, there will be Opportunities for laying further open this Mystery of Iniquity. Here he took the Letter out of his Pocket. My 4th Objection, said he, is, that there's nothing solid to be said for this Treaty. The Defence of it is void of Modesty and Truth, full of trifling and contradiction. As to the manner he says nothing. He thought no doubt, that to make such an Objection, or to answer it, was, to compromise the Prerogative: And does he think in good earnest, that it will not be made? As to the secret Article with the Emperour, he says as little; nay, not a word of it. They hope to keep it secret by amusing Count *Wratislaw* till the Brunt be over. However, to forestall the Clamour, in case it should break out; after having p. 5th, with his usual Modesty, assured us, that the Treaty was for the Interest of the Emperour, and the general Good of Christendom, as well as for the Interest of *England* and *Holland*; in short, a *Catholicon* in *Politics*. He tells us, p. 9th. that nothing was transacted in that Matter, but what was communicated to the Emperour. The very thing, cry'd Mr. R. that I was to inform you of, and which I assure you will be made evident to both Houses, if they make bold with the Partition. I doubt not, replied Mr. S. but You and the Writer know one another's Mind, but supposing what he says to be true, (for I would save the Houses the trouble of his Proofs,) it amounts to nothing, if he would speak out, unless he produce a general Release from the Emperour; or show, that the Article is conditional, or relative (which it is not,) and that the Emperour has fail'd on his part. For the truth of the Matter is, which he, and all you Partitioners dissemble, for Reasons that I am not ignorant of; There

was an older Treaty of Partition which was enter'd into at, or quickly after the Conferences, and was finish'd it's like, during the solemn Embassy; and which, tho' concluded, came to nothing by the Prince Electoral's Death. It was by this Treaty that we broke Faith with the Emperour; for it was never pretended, that it was carried on with his knowledge, or that it was communicated to him, tho' by the Industry of his Ministers, or the pure good Nature of some of you at Court. He came at last to the knowledge of it. Now what was the Emperour, who saw himself thus scandalously abandon'd, to do in this Case? He was convinc'd, that since neither Honour, nor Faith, nor Interest, nor Obligations, nor Resentments, had been sufficient to keep us from entering into Friendship with *France*; it was not in his Power to bring us out of it; and that do what he pleased, we would partition on: What then was he to do, but what he did? Bear all as patiently as he could, that at least he might know the Progress we made.

Pray now Mr. *Smooth* at your rate of arguing, the Dutchess's Plea the other Day, should have been, that her good Nature had been no Secret, that she had been for many years partitioning her self publicly, and the Duke and all the Town knew of it: that is approv'd of it in your Language, if you speak to the Point. Will this Knowledge of the Emperour, like that of the Duke, with fine words, and a fine turn, excuse our Breach of Faith, when at the same time you own with more than usual Ingenuity, tho' with the same Modesty; that the Emperours Court cou'd not be brought to approve of the Treaty, and either wou'd not know, or would not follow their true Interests. Lord! that any Courtier, or Court of ours, who have not these 100 years known, or at least follow'd the true Interests of *England*, should have the Confidence to pretend to teach others theirs. Besides the Writer forgets himself; for he has in the same, p. 9th. given us, tho' with another view, an invincible Reason; and which he owns to be the true one, why the

Emperour could not enter into the Treaty : Because, says he, *it was highly displeasing to the K. of Spain; which sticking out of the Emperour, he says, was a fresh, and very engaging Motive to oblige that King, to favour the Arch Duke in the Point of his Succession.* Had he not then reason to stick out? The truth is, tho the Emperour hath not succeeded, we have; and there is a Will, but he has this to comfort himself with; that however all end, he hath neither abandon'd his own Interest, nor the Interests of *Europe*, nor given any occasion to the Will, as he must have done, had he join'd in that Treaty; of all which he leaves the Honour entire to others. To Mr. L. P. or the Monsieur le Premier of the *supream Magistrate of the two most potent and most flourishing Common-wealths in the Universe*; tho at present on the brink of ruin by a Charm: As another, quite another M. L. P. (if I mistake not) whoever he was that writ the Book) elegantly addresses the great *Arcanum* of our Statesmen, the laudible factious Art, or Art of keeping up Factions by a new intended Balance, in putting themselves always in the heaviest Scale, and never failing to make it the lightest.

I proceed now to your Friends Answer to my second Objection, where indeed lies the strength of the Debate; and to which I own he has said all that can be said for so bad a Cause. Bad, or not bad, said Mr R. you'll find it work enough to confute him. No no, said Mr S. there is indeed Drudgery enough for me who do not like it; and therefore to one who had not the Author's Argument in his Head, as you have, I should scarcely be intelligible; but for work, the Writer is a Man of too much Reason to think so, he is certainly not for the Partition, whatever be the secret Interest that makes him write for it. Nay, tho I do my best to lay open the weakness of his Cause, I am perswaded he cou'd do it infinitely better himself. And indeed it seems in Compassion to an unwary Reader, and possibly to be easy again within, he has done something towards it: Or it was Provi-

dence that made the Antidote to grow with the Poyson. For the last half of the Letter is not of a piece with the first: And had he spoke out and declar'd himself, not only for a Posture, as he does; but also for a War, which no doubt he is for, there had been a more flat Contradiction. The two halves must have torn one another. For then he had been oblig'd to show, that the Confederates were an overmatch to *France* and *Spain* both, which is excellently well done by my Friend, the Author of the Essay, an incomparable piece, but I'm sorry for the Prejudice it does him. So much Sense and Spirit, (to use Mr P's new Word) will not be judg'd *toolable*. But to return to one that is so to their hearts desire, his posture obliges him to no more than to make the Confederates barely Party for *France*. Which however is sufficient for the Quarrel between the two halves; since the strength of his Argument in the first half consists in making them no Party for *France*, even supposing *Spain* neuter, or of their side. I appeal to you, or to the Writer himself, if this be not the true state of his Mind and Letter. Nor could it be otherwise; it is not consistent with one and the same Man to be for the Partition and War, or even the posture of War; which is yet more liable to Objections than a War. For besides that it will cost near as much? it's less reconcilable to the noble Spirit of our People, that are not for halves or tricks, and who have the Courage of the Old Romans, would to God they had their Understanding too, then *potent and flourishing would not be deluded, or worse*; and either a War would not be necessary, or they would know that it was necessary, and how to manage it. To be for a War, or Posture, is to be for the Ballance of *Europe*, to be for the Partition, is to be against it, to be for War, is to be for a Rupture with *France*, to be for the Partition, is to be for an Union and Understanding with *France*. It's to be for the Conference or Conspiracy, of which the manner of the Peace and the Partition were the first Overt Acts. It's to be for the Cause, the Ground, the Reason of



with the Partition, the fatal Secret of the unaccountable Friendship, that makes a War a Rupure (unless the Parliament interpose and look to it) impracticable, or as dangerous and ominous as a Peace.

Now Mr R. I own my Charity in believing that neither you nor the Writer are so far trusted, for you are both Englishmen. Pray then be advised to lay aside the Primacy; you and your Friends will lose more, believe me, by appearing in so scandalous a Cause, than ever ye can get by it. As to your Advice and Charity, answered Mr. R. it's like you are in the right; but why so long a Digression to throw Dirt on my Friend? What does that signify to the Cause? It does, said Mr. S. a great deal (though I own I conceal a better Reason) in shewing that one of his Capacity and Virtue, can make nothing of it, which was what I intended; and not to reflect, tho' he confesses I'm sorry to see such a Pen prostituted, and that your Friend who shows otherwise Capacity and Disposition to do good, should tempt Men to believe, that upon this occasion, he has not superabounded in another quality, which I hope is to be both infinitely more valuable, than all the Capacity that ever any Son of Adam, was Master of. Will you never abstain from Generals, said Mr. R. or what's Personal? I'll now keep close to the Point, reply'd he.

In the 2d Objection I affirm'd two things, that by the Partition considered in it self, and supposing the French had adher'd to the Ballance of Europe was given up; and that there was no necessity for that Treaty, no necessity for such a Sacrifice. It is a pure Complement (if we were to give no return) a Gift, a Free-will Offering. To the first he says nothing expressly, but we may guess at his Answer, had he thought fit to take notice of so obvious and important an Objection. By the Partition, says he, p. 6. *We have secur'd to our selves, that which makes at once our Prosperity and Glory, the invaluable Prero-*

*gative of holding the Ballance of Europe in our Hands.* Just as I told you, we hold it here at Home by making the Party against us the strongest. It's pitty such fine words should signify nothing. I am then to make good, that by the Partition, without regard to its Influence on the Will, the Ballance was given up, a very easie Task, and which he himself will help me to perform. For according to the first half, the Partition was necessary to prevent the loss of the whole; because France, in his Opinion, was an Over-match: In short, then the mighty Debate between us, is, Whether putting more weight in a Scale, it becomes heavier or not? And therefore I ask him, If what France was to get by the Treaty, was an addition of Power as well as of Territory, or not? Not so considerable an addition, it seems he'll answer, as to cast the Ballance. No, Mr Smooth, tho' you have employ'd so many fine words to prove France without that addition, not only weight, but over weight? it's fit to hear him, p. 8. Says he, *Was the Arch-Duke's having two or three Provinces more or less, a sufficient Motive for a War?* And p. 6. *Were not the great Advantages we were to have by the Partition worthy to be purchased at the price of some small sacrifice.* No shame! The time was when to prevent a much less Sacrifice (the loss of a Town or two) was thought a sufficient Motive for War. And as to the great Advantages got by the Treaty, that is a Peace (unless he mean the Secret) Ruin or Desolation (*Solitudo*) has been called Peace long before now. And if God do not prevent it, the Words *Peace of Europe*, may come to have that signification again. Then *Lorraine, Naples, Sicily*, and a Frontier towards *Spain*, thrown into the *Bourbon* Scale, are not enough it seems, to make it weigh down, though it was weight without them. They are but a small Sacrifice, the Dust of the Ballance, not worth the taking notice of, though barring Trade (which they too, under France, may come to have) far more valuable than the Territories of the two Potent Commonwealths.

But *Italy* should thus have been the Seat of War, and our Managers forsooth, if you'll believe them, had outwitted the French, and the Popish Interest, by removing the War from *Flanders*, and from the Protestants; and sowing the Seeds of it among their Enemies. Nay, the Pope, says he, p. 16. and all the Princes of *Italy* would have been of our side, in gratitude I suppose, for the good Office done them. He should have added, that *Italy* would prove a sure Burial-place for the French, as it did formerly. Thus the poor French had been undone, if they had stuck to the Treaty. Why then do we complain of them? It was self-preservation made them break it.

But what trifling is all this? a Prince of such Order and Oeconomy as the French King, can he be stronger in *Italy*, and not stronger too at *Callis* and *Dunkirk*? Can his Power be over weight there, and light here? Can he have *Naples* and *Sicily*, with *Thoulon*, *Marseilles*, and not keep all *Italy* under? Especially since we have not left so much as *Finat*, or any other Footing in *Italy*, to the Arch-Duke, who by the Treaty was to be King of *Spain*, least there should have been a possibility of Communication with *Lombardy*, or of meeting the Emperour in case of need with his Nephew at *Millan*. Is not the whole Treaty evidently a French Draught? In small and great Matters, in form and substance. The Articles for *France* are long and particular, even to Guns and Ammunition; but those for the Confederates are general and short. *Italy* was indeed a Burial-place for the French, under negligent Princes that prefer'd their Pleasures to Business, and kept no Discipline. But has *Italy* been so to them these 80 years since *Richlieu*, and this King had the Reins? Did we not see the contrary in the last War? And as for the Universal Guaranty, and those Leagues of *Italians*, *Swisses*, *Northern Crowns*, &c. p. 10th and 16th. Does he not know that they are *Chimæras*? that never did, and never can amount to any thing. What has the Universal Guaranty signified to the securing the *Pyrenean*, and other Treaties,

more than if there never had been any such thing. Is not even the *Partition Treaty* contrary to it? Will *Italians*, *Swisses*, *Northern Crowns*, if they were tied by thousand Guaranties, make War elsewhere than with one another, and in their Neighbourhood? but as they are hired to do it. And they'll be hired to it without Treaty or contrary to them. Nay, if Guaranties be good for any thing, we may have enough of them now, unless we suppose, that the Frenches having a part would have alarmed *Europe* more than their having the whole does. Besides, if the Emperours not coming into the Treaty could keep the Princes of *Europe* from coming into the Guaranties of it, notwithstanding the joint Solicitations of our triple League, that shows the Power and Influence of the Emperour in bringing in those Princes; in case we join with them to a new League against both the Partition and Will. But why do I labour in vain? Will this Writer teach the French the knowledge of their Interest, as he has done the Emperour. It had been carried in the Councils of *France* to prefer the Partition to the Will, not sure from any regard to the Faith of the Treaty, (who durst take of that?) But as being more safe, and possibly more advantageous in time, had the present Offers tempted their Vanity and Ambition, and that they resolv'd the Duke of *Anjou* should not be Roy, but Viceroy of *Spain*: and tho the Debate was quick over, the Event only can decide who was in the right, so far its past doubt and indecision Matter of Demonstration; that by the Partition the Ballance of *Europe* was given up, which this Writer, as we have heard, complains the securing that Ballance in our hands. Thus the Partitioners secur'd *Flanders*, the Battallions, and have secur'd these Weeks their own Country by Land, and ours by Sea; and thus we shall be secured by the present Treaty of Security, which will like every thing that passes through such Men's Hands, end in no Security, serve only to amuse us; since by *D'aurvaux*'s Memorial on the 5th Instant S. N. the French or Spanish King asks Security for



any such the Dutch; whom it seems he apprehends  
by Land, and it's like will ask Security from  
us here, that when our Fleets out, we do  
not invade him by Sea.

But now I come to the Writers main  
Strength, which is, that the Partition was  
*necessary to prevent the Will, so far was it*  
*from occasioning the Will, in a word, it was*  
*giving a part of that Succession to save the*  
*whole; otherwise we must have had a War,*  
*which we were in no Condition nor Disposi-*  
*tion to make: For we had disbanded our Ar-*  
*my, and turn'd all our thoughts on making*  
*the best advantages we could of the Peace.*  
France was before-hand with us in a readi-  
ness to act; and having its Forces united un-  
der one Chief and Interest, and no Variety of  
Dominions to go through, would have made  
considerable progress in Flanders, and march'd  
directly to Madrid; and being thus possess'd of  
all, p. 3. and 4. it would have been the great-  
est Exploit that ever was compass'd by a Con-  
federacy; nay, it was a thing incredible,  
and beyond all Expectation, *ibid.* and which  
no Man in his Conscience could think, p. 5th.  
say it was impossible, p. 7th. to have redu-  
ced the French by a War even to the Terms  
of the Partition Treaty. To all this I say  
two things, that the Matter of Fact is not  
true, as it is stated, and if it were true, we  
owe it to the Partition.

Had not the Partition either in being or  
in view, or the curst Secret that brought  
in the Partition and all our Miseries, been  
in the way; we had upon the Peace re-  
newed the Confederacy in opposition to  
the growth of France. We had settled all  
quotas of Men, Ships, or Money, (as it  
appears we did in the Publick or Secret  
Partition-Treaty without a Parliament) re-  
volv'd how and where each of the Confe-  
derates was to act; in a word concerted  
all measures imaginable, with respect to  
the King of Spain's Death. So that it  
happening, and every one knowing the  
part that belonged to him, no time had  
been lost. But the Confederates had prepar-  
ed as fast as they could for Execution; and  
we among the rest, in order to do our part,  
had ordered the Parliament immediately to

meet: But in the mean while, till that  
King's Death happened, the Arch-Duke  
might have been transported to Spain, and  
there kept with a Retinue and Splendor  
suitable to the Dignity of the Presumptive  
Heir of Spain. And with a Purse sufficient  
for Generosities, though we had all contri-  
buted to it: Nay, though we had sent him  
Yearly the 50000 l. (it will cost us Mil-  
lions which Pounds would have prevented)  
that was destin'd for K. *Æ* and which I  
dare venture to affirm, has not been so  
well employ'd; and he might have been  
supported there, by the joint Negotiations  
of Ministers from all the Confederates.  
Thus he had got on the Throne without  
any opposition, and we had had Spain and  
its Dominions on our side, in case France,  
notwithstanding such a Posture and readi-  
ness, which is much to be doubted, consi-  
dering the low Estate of their Revenue and  
People, would have engag'd in a War.

But I'll put the case, the Arch-Duke had  
not been sent, (as it happen'd) during the  
King's Life, though I know nothing to  
have hinder'd it, but the Partition-Treaty;  
he had however, barring that Treaty, con-  
tinued in the Will, in which he once was.  
And in that case, we had quickly transport-  
ed both him and Troops to Spain or Portu-  
gal. It's true our Army had been disband-  
ed, as it is; but much of what I have said,  
might have been done above board, and the  
Parliament engag'd by an Address to the  
King, to support him in such Alliances, as  
he judg'd necessary, not for favouring, but  
for opposing the growth of France. No  
English Parliament would have declined  
to make such an Address, or have fail'd to  
make it good. But the Case was never  
put to the People of England, Ballance or  
no Ballance. Inform them, convince them,  
that that is the Case, that by no Ballance  
their Honour, Religion, and Liberty, are  
at Stake; they'll throw in their Lives and  
Estates, save all or lose all, and neither  
Troops nor any thing else will be wanting.  
How unhappy or perverse are you at Court,  
that either never know; or never will take  
the right way. Are you asham'd to Copy

after a Woman? Ye have one Reason on your side, which it's like ye know nothing of. She would have been asham'd to Copy after such as you.

But now to consider Matters, not as they ought to have been, and would have been, had there been no Partition; but such as they were upon the King of *Spain's* Death, which I am under no obligation to do; for *Versanti in illicito, consequentia sunt imputanda*. However I'll compute with your Friend when you please, and convince him, that in *October* last the Confederates had more Troops than the French King, and without doubt more Ships; and before the time of Action could have been, much superiour to him both by Sea and Land; nor could the Marching an Army to *Madrid* have prov'd so easie a matter, because of the difficulties to have Provisions and Carriage: if we had immediately (which we might have done) made our selves Masters on the Coast, by taking along with us but a few Troops at first, till we had seiz'd on some good Harbour or other. Besides, what could it amount to, if he had gone to *Madrid*? He will not now exchange *Brussels* or *Antwerp* for that Town; if not in the manner in which he is to quit them, by the present Treaty of Security, and which is to be our grand Security, for preserving forsooth the precious Peace of *Europe*; that is so as to have it in his Power to retake them when he shall think fit; or when he shall have brought the Affairs of the Spanish Monarchy into order.

The French at the Revolution were much more before-hand with the Confederates, had many more Troops all in a readiness under one Chief and Interest, &c. and what got they by the War, even manag'd as it was, though we had a Government to settle, and that *Ireland* gave us a Diversion two Year, and *Scotland* as much. Besides, the Emperor being in a War with the Turks; I do not think we had above the number of the Scots Army from him to assist us. Then the Dukes of *Hanover*, and *Saxe Gotha*, the Bishop of *Munster* and several others, had formed a 3d Party in the

Empire in Conjunction with the King of *Sweden*, to force a Peace in favour of *France*; which though it never came to act, yet for several Years no Assistance was had from those Princes; and the Jealousie which they gave, oblig'd others in their Neighbourhood to keep part of their Troops at home. So that in effect, the Confederacy for some time had no great help from the *Lower Saxony*, which is the Strength of *Germany*. The Circles too of *Franconia* and *Swabia* came not into the War in good earnest, till towards the end of it. And it's to be considered, that not only the Emperor's own Strength, but a great part of the Stength of the Empire, was employ'd in the War of *Hungary*; whereas at present the Emperor has his hands free; and a vast Addition of Power by the peaceable Possession of that Kingdom, (not to mention *Transylvania*) which alone as it is, will be very serviceable to him; and when it shall have a little time to breathe, and Liberty of Conscience (which we might procure them, were there not a Secret Article, or a Secret Disposition somewhere at least, not to mind such Matters) will be worth all his Hereditary Dominions, and he having the Interest of his Family at Stake, and a faster hold of the Empire as it happens, than ever he had upon any other occasion; it's to be presum'd that as he can, so he will act in the War in good earnest. And as the Emperor's Quarrel and *Portugals* too, is upon the Foot of Rights or Self-Preservation; so the Dutch being engag'd both for their Country and Religion, it's to be suppos'd they'll make their utmost effort, and will have more work, and I hope more wisdom too, than to give umbrage here by laying hold too eagerly on the Advantages that our Managements in matters of Trade offer them, and which indeed is not so much to be imputed to them, for it's natural to Trading People to make their best of the Market, as to some Tools here, who officiously hindred the remedying of the Coin as long as they could; and have been the cause of other Disorders, barely to recover



King of and ingratiate themselves at home, where they are as much hated and despised as here.

But all this is unnecessary Labour, continued he, turning over the Leaves of the Letter; for your Friend the Writer does not believe his own state of Matters, at the King of Spain's Death. See p. 10th. where with the Phantom of a Guaranty, we could order France as we pleas'd, and p. 14th. where he will not allow France to suppose that the Emperour will bear the Injury done his Son, notwithstanding the hopes he may pretend to of having England, Holland, and Portugal of his side. Where is now the Improbability, nay, and Impossibility, &c. and p. 16th. where in case the Partition Treaty had succeeded; France had been bound to a peaceable Behaviour, and kept from any Infractions and Innovations, the 2 powerful Nations, &c. tho as we have heard neither in a Condition, nor a Disposition to make War, wou'd have been on the back of France, but because that Treaty has not succeeded, are enchanted and can do nothing, tho France be upon their Back, and p. 24. *We are*, says he, *in great and apparent Dangers, and must not quietly expect our destiny* (that is, no longer trust to Predestination) *without making use of those Remedies, we have still in reserve to provide against them.* Pray how came we by those Remedies? and where were they in reserve? Had we none of them when the King of Spain died? and therefore its like did not call a Parliament: Is France weaker than it was, by the addition of Flanders and Milan? I own they are, by having your Bugbear of Madrid. Thus it was that we were to weaken him by the Partition, for which, is the strength of your Cause, upon his having added to his Empire Lorrain, Naples, Sicily, &c. the Guaranty of Popes, Swisses, and Northern Crowns, and why not Jews, Moors, Turks, nay if you please, with Mr. Ford's leave, Opticks, Catoptricks, Dioptricks, and Staticks, all Kingdoms or States (equally jealous for the Partition) would have been so hard upon him; that *he durst not have ventured to offer at an Infraction.*; and p. 25.

*We must make others sensible, that we have still both the Will and the Power to look our selves, and stand by our Allies.* No doubts of our Power, but he in his Partition half; for this is his posture half; but as to *our Will*, God knows, and I believe very few more, what that is: Nor do I know whom he means by Allies; we have abandon'd our old ones, and our new ones he would have us believe have abandon'd us. Holland and we I reckon the same, (and whoever reckons otherwise is an Enemy to both) equally abandon'd if he mean the People, and that have equally broke with their Allies if he mean the Government. However he comforts us, by telling us, that we may avert Mischiefs, by putting our selves in a posture, and by addressing to His Majesty to enter into Alliances, &c. that having such a Chief we cannot want Power to help our selves. — That his Majesty can effectually provide for the common Safety. That he the Writer, would tremble with the thoughts of the Danger, were we now wanting the unvaluable Benefit of so renown'd a Prince's Prudent Administration, — who so gloriously fills the Throne, — has such Credit in Germany, such sway in Holland, &c. ALL WHICH IS OWN'D, THO NOT TO HINDER YOU TO MAKE IT GOOD. But pray now, after you have reconcil'd this end of your Letter with the beginning of it, reconcile both with the prudent Administration, since the King of Spain's Death. The Prudent doing nothing, but losing 4 Months when the loss of a day was too much. For whether the Partition Treaty only could have sav'd us, as in the Partition half is affirm'd; or that Treaty being lost, a Posture was necessary, as we are told in the Posture half: It's Matter of Fact that we have neither had Partition nor Posture these 4 Months. And if the Writer has not in this time trembled, but relied on the prudent Administration; he has no doubt got into the secret of this Prudence, which I wish he would impart, were I sure it would have the same Effect upon me; but that which gives one Man Courage may terrify another.

I have now insisted on the Prevarication, Disfingenuity, Contradiction and Trifling, that is in the Management of this Debate: But I have still in reserve, that which is more extraordinary than all these; a piece of Forgery which is strange they shou'd have ventur'd upon, but You and I know them. I do not charge the Writer with this, he followed Direction. The Matter of Fact is, as follows p. 6, 7, and 8. *Our Court when the Treaty was set on foot, had very good Intelligence and Advice from less suspected Hands; (Schonenberg, our Envoy no doubt, the Jew, for Jew or Gentile if Tool and Forreigner, it's all one) than the French Ministers who made no secret of the Matter, both at home and abroad; but rather affected to publish it, that the Emperours Party dwindled, and the Marquiss d' Harcourt improv'd his Masters Interest, and gain'd Ground daily. That those who had the chief ascendant over the King, and were most likely to influence him in the making of his Will, were altogether inclin'd for one of the Dauphin's Sons. And therefore England and Holland enter'd into the Treaty of Partition, from the Apprehensions they had of such a Will, and to prevent the Effects of it; so far was the Treaty from giving occasion to the Will: Nay, tho the Treaty of Partition had never had a Being, the King and Grandees meerly to shun a War, had been for the Duke of Anjou, p. 8. You see Sir, continued he, how much the World has been in the wrong to the poor innocent Treaty, as if it had been guilty of producing the Will, which has been not only the general Opinion, I shou'd say Universal Persuasion, since the Will appear'd; but I dare give my Oath, that several of us Coffee-house Statesmen about the Town, had no sooner seen the Treaty, than we gave Spain for lost. Nor were we at all surpris'd with the News of the Will, and yet less with the acceptation of it. It's true, that notwithstanding such Proofs of our State-Capacity, we were quickly a-ground in concluding there would be a War. We err'd in judging of Courts by our selves, as if they could not digest that which we in our private Ca-*

capacity would not fail to resent. ---Pray, no Raillery said Mr. R. what! replied he, would you have me seriously run my Head against such Impudence. In one Page *Harcourt's* Intreigues make the Will, in the other the dread of a War, or a *fearful Prudence* does it. If so, why was it not made twenty years ago? when the Confederates were yet in a much worse condition to support *Spain*, and all the Wars since might have been prevented; but I'll allow them to join *Harcourt*, and the Danger in that Exploit. The Intelligence, the Advice, the Apprehension of such a Will, came all too late to give Birth to partitioning; since there was an older Partition, as I have told you, concluded upon the Peace, older than the Intreigues of the *Harcourts*, or the Influences of the *Portocareros*.

So here's a scurvy Achronisme, by which a fine turn is lost, that instead of the Partition's producing the Will, the Will had produced the Partition: But to proceed; If they who had the greatest Ascendant over the King, were altogether inclin'd for the French, so that a Will in favour of them was almost certain, and that this was no Secret; How come the Court of Vienna (though we too forwarn'd them of it, p. 10.) not to believe it? But to feed themselves with vain hopes, that the Will would run altogether on the Arch-Dukes side, and not to be undeceived but by the event, p. 12. Tho they had the Queen and Court of *Spain* (a few excepted) to disabuse them: But we'll suppose them dull and apt to flatter themselves. How came the French, who were so sure of the Will, that they made no Secret of it; but affected to publish it every where; How came they to suffer themselves to be Trick'd by us into the Partition Treaty? For if after they got the Will on their Side, it was impossible to hinder them from having *Spain*, &c. as your Friend hath told us: What had they to apprehend, if they were sure of the Will? Why should they have renounc'd solemnly by a Treaty, that which they were intreaguing so industriously for, and which they reckon'd themselves sure of



To quit the whole in order to make sure a part, when they doubted not of the whole, looks odd. I begin now to suspect, that the Treaty was a Complement, which they made us, and not one that we made them; and therefore we stipulated nothing; but are in their Debt. In a word, it seems we wheedled them one way or other, out of their Senses and Understanding; and the French to escape Perjury, (did they value it) might have own'd themselves dupp'd and declar'd the Treaty void upon the Head of *Dolus Malus*.

Pray now. Mr R. Is this tollerable? Is Mankind thus to be impos'd on? In short, either this Story is true or not: If not, we should not have been told it, lest we should believe it, and if true, still we should not have been told it, for the same reason. For whoever believes it, must believe that the Treaty was a packt business, to make the Will sure, and the Affectation to talk of the Will as sure, was to give a colour to the Treaty, of which more by and by.

However that be, sure its reasonable to believe the Spaniards themselves as to the influence the Treaty had upon the Will. Now all Europe knows what Memorials the Spanish Ministers have given every where, both before and since the last Treaty, complaining of Partitioning as an unprecedented Practice, against the Laws of God and Man; and as an Indignity done them, which they would oppose and revenge with the last drop of their Blood. Did not *Don Quiros* several Months before the Treaty (which shews the design of the Treaty older than we pretend) warn the States that there was no expedient imaginable, that could prevent the Disinheriting their Monarchy, which they would not lay hold on? Nay, that they would call Arm from 15 to 60, rather than suffer it. And we know how bold the Marquis *De Canalles* made with that Treaty here; for which, that is, for calling it by its true name, a detestable Machination; he was commanded to go out of the Kingdom. It's pity those for the thing should stay behind.

But what need we other Evidence? Will we not believe the King of Spain himself concerning his own Will? It's true, you Courtiers often order matters so, that Men are shy to take a Princes word; but it were hard, Mr R. not to allow us to believe them when they are dying. Now that King, who as the Author of the Letter owns, p. 9. *Was highly displeased with the Treaty*, tells us in his Will, p. 8. *That his chief Obligation was to take care of the welfare of his Subjects, which was to order matters so, that all his Kingdoms might continue united.* And p. 9. *That he would never consent, that a Monarchy founded by his Ancestors, with so much glory, should be dismember'd or diminish'd in any manner.* Who can have patience with a Writer, and indeed with the whole Herd of Partitioners, who must have seen this, and yet tell us that the Treaty did not give occasion to the Will, but their fore-knowledge of the Will gave birth to the Treaty.

It's a harder, or rather more dangerous Question, Whether our Partitioners foresaw that the Treaty would beget the Will or not? I have told you that we Coffee-House States-Men, did foresee it; it's but natural and modest, to suppose that Men of business, true States-Men, have better Eyes than we. If so, they were for the Will. Those that are for the Premises, and understand them, must be for the Conclusion. It's agreed amongst Modern Divines, that the consequences of any Opinion (which holds equally true in matters of Fact) are not to be imputed to him that's for it, unless he see them: But if he see them, he is chargeable with them. Thus it seems we are insensibly brought, not by Treachery (since the Partitioners would not betray themselves) but by obvious reasoning, from the nature of the thing, into the Secret of all that we were to do for France; and it is but reasonable, since we have helpt them to the Spanish Monarchy, to secure them in the Possession of it; by securing the Peace of Europe. We have then got a great way, and are now only at a loss to know the equivalent, to know what

what *France* was to do for us : But we are not at so great a loss even in that, as most Men imagine. The equivalent in part was discovered long ago, by Men of Understanding. And now that the Scene opens, nay, by what has been talkt within these few days, it appears that even the Multitude will quickly come to the knowledge of that part of it ; and more time (the honestest and surest Spie) will not fail to give further light. I wish it may not be too late for any good use to be made of it. In the mean while, I'll beg one favour of my Friends ; which is to have an Eye upon Roman Catholicks and other Jacobites, not to take the advantage of the Law against them, which is neither my business nor inclination, if they continue quiet ; but in order to know upon what ground we stand. Till the Peace, they were according to the natural tendency of their Principles, violently set against this Government. Upon the Peace they were on the sudden, one would think, conjur'd into such a complacency in it, and zeal for it, that they seem'd, by their dutiful behaviour, to surpass those who had always been for the Government. If now upon the settling the Succession, they change their Note, and be again what they were in the time of the War ; it is not necessary for a Man to be a Conjuror, to find out what has been at the bottom.

But, said Mr. R. you know our Zeal in that Matter, and no Man was more forward in it, than he whom you call the Grand Partitioner ; I am, said he, pretty well inform'd how it went. That those most against it appear'd most for it, that with much difficulty you were prevail'd with, to give us for once in your Administration a stroke of *Queen Elizabeth*, in swallowing with a good Grace, that which you knew would have been cram'd down. Possibly too you were catch't, it's like you trusted to the Principles, or Inclinations of a Party. But the Party-Interest will always carry it, both against you and themselves. Nay, possibly you are thus without breaking the Peace, (for that would bear an Action) taking your

Revenge for the loss of the Partition ; and as for the Partitioner, all is not lost that is in danger. How great pity were it, that so sweet and fine a Gentleman as *M. L. W.* should loose all the Pains he has been at, in making his Court ? for it's known, that while the Father was treating, the Son was hunting with young Master ; and none so officious as he, to be in the way of doing little Services. If thus he is to be in due time one of our Governours, since he puts so early in for it ; our Comfort must be, that his Father shall have bequeath'd him his Talent at Business. You promis'd, said Mr. R. to keep to the Point ; but this is to no Point ; for supposing there was Ground for such Visions : this would be an Instance of what further we were to do for *France*, and not of what *France* is to do for us. I grant you, replied he, it is so at first view ; but think on it till we meet again : I submit to Correction, and return to the Letter.

The Observation, that the Partitioners must of necessity, in making the Treaty, have foreseen the Will, as the consequence of it ; and the inference made from this, that they were for the Will, are so obvious and natural, that they could not but foresee them, and provide the Dust of the forgot Story you have heard, to be thrown into our Eyes. They own then that they foresaw the Will. And indeed how was it possible for them not to foresee it ? But they foresaw it they say, as that which was to be tho there had been no Partition Treaty. The French Intrigues, and the danger of War could not fail to bring it to pass : And therefore they enter'd not into the Treaty, so much to prevent the Will, which they had no great hopes of succeeding in, as to prevent the Effects of the Will.

Not to repeat, that they had partition'd for the Prince Electoral long before this ; that thus the French swore and forswore needlessly, that the Emperour and Queen of *Spain* knew nothing of this, tho the French, you say, affected to publish it ; and that you had forwarn'd the Emperour of it ; that the K. of *Spain*, and all his Ministers assure us of the contrary. I add th

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which alone were a sufficient Confutation of this ridiculous Story; that since the Treaty the Arch Duke was in a Will. Besides you at Court never pretended when the Treaty came out, that it was made to prevent a Will, or the Effects of a Will, of which ye show'd no Apprehension. Nay, I'm sure the generality of Partitioners were struck with the News of the Will. I own I cannot but think, that those in the secret of the Partition were far from being surpriz'd with such News whatever they pretended; as I have been told was done by one, a greater Man than the Writer whoever he be. But this was not, as they would have us to believe, because they had foreseen the Will, before ever the Treaty was in being, as a necessary Consequence of the Disposition of the Spanish Court; but that by the Partition they had in good earnest made the Will inevitable.

I will further add, that which gives great Light to the Matter; and to which I do not indeed know what can be said. It is this: If in making the Treaty ye supposed a Will, and provided against the Consequences of it; that is, relied on the known Regard that the French have to Treaties; yet it is not credible, that ye were so far intoxicated, with an Opinion of the French Probity; that ye did not still apprehend a Will, apprehend that it might prove too strong a Temptation, of which ye say ye forswa'n'd the Emperour. Sure your Confidence cou'd go no further, it could not exclude a Jealousy.

When one Man trusts another, he trusts either his Honour, or Character, or Friendship, or Religion, or Interest, or his own Power to make him keep his Word. The Writer has told us that it was the want of the last Surety that begot the Partition. The whole in Point of Interest is no doubt preferable to a part. The Argument at *Paris*, in favour of the Partition was founded upon the present Necessity of shutting a War. As to the other four Ties, the French had forfeited their Credit with respect to them all, upon as many occasions as they have had to do it: but particularly upon the

same Subject with that of the Partition. The solemn and express Renunciations made at the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, p. 11. which one would have thought was such a visible spreading of the Net, that no Bird thereafter would have flown into it.

At the time of that Treaty Honour was boiling and high, a Character was to be acquir'd, Friendship was fresh and warm, a Father-in-law, a Brother-in-law, and a young Queen with a Prince's first Oaths and Renunciations before he was feared. Oaths upon the Gospels, and at the Altar sworn over and over again; (for so *Phil.* the 4th would have it) to ensure and double the Perjury; which Perjury was in being at the very moment of swearing, as appears thereafter by the Date of the private Orders, given for Succours to *Portugal*. It came into my thoughts the other day, when God, with the help of Mr. *Mountain's* lively and honest Zeal withheld the Commons, that he has still a regard to the Honour of Parliaments; and therefore reserves their owning, for him whose Right it is. Sure God never gave a Crown that was got by such daring, solemn and (after as much time as the reprobate Israelites had in the *Wilderness* to repent in) repeated Profanations of his Name. I may add, that the Pious, and every way a Pattern and Model of true English Vertue and Worth, the deceas'd Sir *Edw. Harley* would have been of my Mind.

Now I own, that notwithstanding all this, you are still capable of trusting France; to show you, that I'm tractable; and because you have done it: But then it will I hope be yielded to me, that there remain'd with you a Jealousy and Doubt at bottom; that a Prince of an Age at which no Man changes to the better, might still be capable of acting like himself; and therefore, since ye apprehended a Will, and enter'd into the Treaty to prevent the Consequences of it; or rather to prevent it. For that was the surer way; surer not to suffer the French to be led into Temptation, than to get them out of it.

I may conclude without hesitating, that besides the Treaty, you took all other Measures

Measures imaginable to prevent the Will.

Now the only other sure Measure to prevent the Will, if that Matter stood, as we have heard it stated by you, was to send the Arch Duke to *Madrid*, which indeed had infallibly hindered the Will, and did not interfere with the Partition. *France, England and Holland* being equally powerful to make that good, as if he had been still at *Vienna*. How could the Emperour, do ye think, have maintain'd the Arch Duke there, against such a triple League; have ye not told us, that tho we and the Emperour had been in the League against the French, we could not all three have hinder'd them alone from marching straight to *Madrid*, and seizing the whole. So that it's evident, the Arch Dukes Presence at *Madrid*, might have hindered the Will, but could not have hinder'd the Partition; and therefore considering the Probability, or certainty of the Will, and the danger from it, if it was not prevented; it was manifestly the Interest of *England and Holland*, notwithstanding the Partition Treaty; nay, in order to preserve that Treaty, to have had the Arch Duke at *Madrid*.

I own, said Mr. R. you are in the right: But the French would not agree to the Arch-Duke's going to *Milan* or *Madrid*, during the King of *Spain's* Life, unless the Emperour would first join in the Treaty.

But it's that, said Mr. S. that I complain of; for though so long as the Emperour stood out, it was not reasonable, since you were in Friendship with the French, to do any thing without them, meerly to gratifie him; yet since in this whole transaction, you say that we were to have nothing to our selves, and that we had singly before our Eyes the Publick good, and the Peace of *Europe*. We the Mediators, p. 7. ought to have had no regard to the Humours either of *France* on the one hand, or the Emperour on the other: but as our Concern for that Publick Good had made us join with *France*, for a Partition; so the same Concern should have made us join with the Emperour against the Will; and consequently in transporting the Arch-

Duke to *Madrid*, even though the Emperour would not own the Treaty, which he could not own, without giving occasion to the Will, as we did; and without irritating the Spanish Nation to such a degree, that they would not have received the Arch Duke.

It had been better so, said Mr. R. especially as things have happen'd. You see then, continued Mr. S. that even a Conditional Article, not to suffer the Arch-Duke to go to *Milan* or *Madrid*, during the King of *Spain's* Life, unless the Emperour first own'd the Treaty, was absurd and intolerable. On the contrary, there should have been an Article of Agreement with *France*, not to oppose the Arch-Dukes going to *Madrid*. The refusing this, would have been (as the asking the other Article was a plain Discovery of the French Secret (if we did not know it) that they intended to have the whole, since they could have no other reason for being against the Arch-Dukes going to *Madrid*, but that his Presence there would have hindered the Will. Nor is it conceivable what reason we had to join with *France* in this, if we were indeed against the Will; but if our not stipulating freedom to the Arch-Duke to go to *Madrid*, and much more our consenting to the Article as you understand it, that he should not go till the Emperour own'd the Treaty, be unaccountable: What will you say if I shew you that the Article is not conditional as you suppose, but absolute. It's ordinary for you at Court to commit mistakes, for ye will be at no pains. Pray hear me read the Article. *The most serene Arch Duke shall not pass into Spain, nor into the Dutchy of Milan, during the Life of his Catholick Majesty; but with common consent.* That is in short, he shall pass to neither of these places, without the consent of *France*, so long as it is possible for him to hinder the Will. Here's an absolute Tye, and no room left to make it either Conditional or Relative, though the Emperour had still three Months, by the Publick Treaty, to come in; (not to mention two by the Secret one, which is not

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to the point.) His coming in, as you own, might have hasten'd the Will, by irritating the King of *Spain*, and that Nation against him, but still it had neither been in his Power nor yours, according to the Treaty, to have sent the Arch-Duke to *Madrid* without the consent of *France*. Which shews with all the strength and demonstration that such Works of Darkeness are capable of that this Article was expressly calculated and stipulated to secure the Will. It's impossible to suppose Men so dull (and yet that's the greatest Complement we can make to the Managers) as not to have seen this. Nay, it was seen and oppos'd by some, but in vain. *Now talk no more to me of Popes and Swisses, of Leagues and Guarantees, WHO CAN BE GUARANTEE FOR A MAN AGAINST HIMSELF?*

I own, said Mr. R. you have confounded me, and I know not what we have to say to it. But I can tell you, replied Mr. S. what you can do to it, even by Agreement, put the Reverse of this Article in the Secret Treaty, or give it out that it is so, and then ye may pretend the Publick one was but a Bugbear to fright the Emperor; that is, ye may own your selves Traytors, or Mediators who betray'd all to one side.

Here he stop'd a little, and then went on. I perceive, Mr. R. you are uneasie; but you little think that I have still in reserve a Match for the 8th Article. That's impossible, said Mr. R. Nay, replied he, since you provoke me, I will at least mention it. It is, in a word, that ye do not prevent the loss of your Partition. If that be all, said Mr. R. laughing (for he was glad to find that Mr. S. had not got into any new secret) suffer me to tell you, that the French Article will do better alone, or you may if you will, couple it with the Article betwixt us and the Emperor. I know, answered he, why you laugh; you pretend to have been always for a War, and that you have outwited the whole Nation; having been forsooth as you would have us believe, from the beginning, in the right way to compass it. I know there are none like you, so able to impose by Artifice and

Trick, in your own Opinion and ours too; though at present we must differ. We are indeed outwited, if no Parliament, no Preparations, no Negotiations for four Months, express Declarations of your Mind, or of your acquiescing at the MEETING, and concerting measures for owning the Duke of *Anjou*, a Ministry, a Party, a Speech, a Speaker, a Parliament, as much as in you lay, with *Flanders* and the Battalions in French hands, all in appearance for a Peace, be indeed proper Methods for coming at War; so ye may talk to others, and blind them with your Military Inclinations, as if the Triple League, or French, Prerogative, Party, Inclinations, were not stronger; but if you talk to me thus, there's an end of all Conversation. If indeed you'll tell me that you have chang'd your Mind from Peace, or Posture, to War, I'll hear you, and examin if there be any change in your proceedings; for I'm grown old, and cannot be young again, to judge of Courts as I formerly did, otherwise than by their Actions. I always thought (and therefore troubled no body with my Reasons for a War) that the weight of the thing, or the levity of the French, who cannot bear Prosperity, would bring it on; though both you and they, you contrary to your Interest, and they according to theirs, had resolv'd on the Peace of *Europe*, *THE SOLITUDO*; I was only in pain, that first you would lose a great deal of Time, and consequently a great many Advantages; and after that you would come awkwardly into the War, and even as awkwardly manage it. But still I must tell you freely, that I have not yet observed any change in your Conduct, to convince me that you have chang'd your Mind. The French King indeed seems to be elevated by his Success, so as to have chang'd his; and it's like the business of the Succession will confirm him in this change. For whatever you think, or however innocent you may be, which is not my point-at-present, when I'm only to charge you with the Partition; allow me however to tell you, that to cover the infamy with which the French

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loaded their own Court, for sacrificing so great a Frontier, and K. *J.* too to the Peace, words at that time drop'd from the OLD WOMAN, which with the Medals then struck at *Paris*, in favour of the Prince of *Wales*, and the care you have taken to explain what was dark in those Words and Medals, convince me that he'll reckon what you are about, a breaking with him. Thus Self-preservation may bring ye into a War; but which was my point, resentment will not do it. The French may break with you, but ye will not break with them, if ye can help it. Pray have patience but one week, said Mr. R. I have told you, replied he, that though we should engage in a War, that's not to the point; patience you say. You know sure, resentment or true Mettal have no patience. Do not reason, do not deliberate, do not put all up, and draw after four Months. And since that is not our case, (for all the World knows and admires your Mettal;) there's something yet worse in it. There's a dead weight upon the Mettal, sure you at Court resented the villanous Practices of the French, in carrying on Plots and Assassinations, and yet your resentment even of this, could not keep you from entering into Friendships with them, not Partitioning for them. Can any resentment then make ye break with them?

You'r a strange Man, said Mr. R. Was never the dread of Assassination a Bond of Friendship real or pretended before now? Is that a new thing? Are not Princes to preserve their Lives the best way they can? And when they have to do with Enemies that stop at nothing, had they not better compound the Matter, and be so and so together, than fall an unavoidable Sacrifice to their Wickedness? Nay, if that be the Case Mr. R. said he, it solves a great many Phenomena; but I cannot comprehend how Men that despise the irresistible Force of a Cannon Ball, should dread the trembling Hand of an Assassin. I do not affirm, said Mr. R. that it is the Case; but if it be, there's nothing new nor strange in it. Do not you know Men personally bold, that

are timorous in Business? Assassination is Business, and not Fighting. Have you not heard of Men famous at tilting, who could not see a Surgeons Lance? All Men, if they were well known, would appear to be a Composition of Contradictions. *Caligula* us'd to creep into a Hole when it thunder'd, and to piss on *Jupiter's* Statue when the Thunder was over. Men's Tempers are as inconsistent and unaccountable as their, or your Conduct. Besides such a Weakness may run in the Blood, for which a Man is not answerable. Did not King *James* the first upon *Gondimar's* Whisper about the invisible silent Powder change his Measures, with Relation to the Jesuits. As for that Ancestor, replied Mr. S. he was a known Coward; he jump'd in his Mother's Belly upon the fright she got at *Rizzi's* Death, and trembled ever after at the shadow of Danger. But what think you of *Henry* the 4<sup>th</sup>, said Mr. R. another great Grandfather, who was a brave Man, and every way a Heroe. You see by his Discourse with the Duke of *Sully*; that he thought there was no Possibility of securing his Person, but by courting his Enemies. I own said Mr. S. that he was brave, and every other way a Heroe if you please; but cannot think him one in this. Was it he roick, and not rather weak and foolish, to join with Jesuits or Assassins, in order to escape Assassination? Like the Man, who upon seeing an Execution, dispatch'd himself, died for fear of Death. Thus the King, and many other Princes have lost themselves: Whereas our *Tudor* race, of *Harry* and his Daughter, could boldly throw down Convents, and hang Jesuites, if they took the wise and princely way of securing their Persons, by making sure, not of the Affections of their Enemies, but of their Heads, by putting it not out of the Will, (which they themselves could not do,) but out of their Power to make such Attempts; and so it far'd with them. Believe there's any thing of this at the bottom. Tho you be warm, answer'd Mr. I know you are discreet, and will keep



Secret. I own then to you, that both I and others have observ'd a change ever since Charnock's Plot; and it's the only Key we have for decyphering many things that have happen'd since. O unhappy Charnock! cried out Mr S. hang'd and dam'd without the Comfort of knowing that he had succeeded! Thus the Partition is another unfortunate Jolly, and cannot be resent'd, and that was my Point. The Mule stumbled, and he was drowned. The Emperour gave a Pretence, p. 10. and Friend Partition was lost. However, the Mule discovered a Bargain by dropping Treachery. Would to God some Mule of a Minister had stumbled 4 Months ago, and drop'd Enmity; but what can our trifling, clandestine, intercepted Treachery signify? Since their open Perfidy, back't with Scorn and Insolence hath amounted to nothing, it must be as you intimate; I would be glad to be sure there were no more in it; for a War will break that Chain which alone were a good Reason for one. You'll be of my Mind when you have thought of it. I shall now detain you but a very little while. Forgive me for interrupting you, said Mr. R. Will you have satisfied me in one thing, least I forget it. Pray what makes you so violent against us? I always hop'd that we had one hold or other of you, and that there was still as much of the old Leven remaining, as upon occasion would have heav'd the whole Lump. Sir, said he, in a word, I love my Country, and know you, and that's all: I am for no Divorce. Divorces cost dear, and there's but one common Interest, if you would follow it. And therefore, tho I talk with Heat and Indignation of you, and am indeed always against you, when you are against your selves; yet no Man is more desirous than I am to see you return to a right Mind: nor when that is, will be more ready to serve you. In short, this is the bottom I am on. And I'll now conclude with that which I think an instance of it in my plain and rough way, however impertinent you at Court will reckon it to be.

It can then no more be controverted, that by the Partition Treaty, supposing the French had reject'd the Will, and stuck to it, the Ballance of Europe was given up, to prevent a War say the Partitioners (which is owning the Fact.) To maintain which Ballance we and all the rest of Europe, except the Enemies of the Ballance, have been making War near these 200 Years. Now pray tell me, is not this yielding to shun fighting, the very Character of a Coward? Sure no Hero ever did so? And shall it be told to Posterity, that our Hero, the Hero of the Age, the Hereditary Hero, and Protector NOT OF THE PEACE, BUT OF THE BALLANCE AND LIBERTIES OF EUROPE shall have done it! Shall have given all up without a Blow; without putting it to a Trial; without leaving somewhat to Providence, and waiting till the danger came, or possibly till it was over; till the King of Spain died, or the Arch Duke had been on the Throne. He, the peculiar and unparallel'd honour of whose Family it is, to have almost in the memory of Man, maintained that Ballance against the two powerful Pretenders in their several turns, France and Spain: And who will perfect and finish the incomparable weight of Glory which has been transmitted to him; heightned by him, and must with his Family it seems terminate in him (for it will admit of no further addition, but that at hand.) Provided I say upon this wonderful Conjunction, the Crisis of his Character and Story, he can restore, maintain and exalt that Character, by restoring and maintaining there is no other way, the Ballance (for as it sinks he and the harmonious sound of ORANGE must sink too) restore it not against France, or Spain, as he and his Ancestors have done, but against France and Spain united under one Head, and in one Empire, which never Man did nor had an opportunity to do, and which it is the Star and Heaven of a Heroe to have, and lay hold on; but the Disgrace and Reprobation of a Heroe, to have, and let go. He finishes, I say, his Character, and the Glory of his Family, if he does this, or even if he DIES IN THE ATTEMPT. And which, after all, he may still

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still doe, if berring or breaking upon so heinous and publick an Indignity done him, the Chains of Conferences, solemn favourite Embassies, Partitionings, and all other Works of Darknes; he resume himself, all above-board, own the Cause, and those that are for him and it, and laying aside all little froward Politicks, or RESENTMENTS AND RUINOUS NOT TENABLE PREROGATIVES, throw himself upon his People, trust them, and God who is good, tho absent, may yet bless him, and turn the Hearts as well as the Eyes of all honest Men towards him. Thus here the Glory and Magnificence of the second Temple may come to excel those of the first. His Age and Health may be supported and cherished not with the Pleasures and Honours of his Youth, the awkward Satisfaction of Successes got by Defeats, Successes by Patience and Perseverance in a tedious Course of Misfortunes, by miserable insensible Progresses in a languishing consuming War; in which even the most inconsiderable Advantages scarcely ever failed to have for inseparable Companions a bitter Draught, unlucky Mixture that allayed, or lost the Pleasure of them.

*Solaced*

But his Age may be so laid with ~~igne~~ and lasting Felicity, not transient Amusements, but solid Contentment, the permanent and unmix'd Pleasures of a serene Mind. A

Mind conscious of its own Innocence and Integrity; conscious of the purity of Intentions, sublime and sutable to the Dignity of a noble Cause. A Mind rejoicing in the prospect of what is to come, by confiding in such a Conscience, or the Memory of what is past.

Rejoycing in Successes, in which these Kingdoms and all Europe may share. Successes got with undoubted Honour, and by unquestioned Victories. VICTORIES OVER HIMSELF, (WHERE VICTORY MUST BEGIN.) Over his Enemies (who can resist a Prince that Conquers himself) and in the Hearts of his People, where Victory never fails to follow, not FIGHTING WITH THEM, but love for them, and confidence in them.

Such are the LAWRELS that will render him every way Immortal. Lawrels that will never fade; but transmit him to what is next, and to Posterity (the two IMPARTIAL Tribunals, and therefore only terrible to such as need PARTIALITY.) Transmit him, WILLIAM THE GREAT, who deceiv'd all Mankind, and died Greater than he had lived; died Sealing and Bequeathing to them, as the Result of his Life, and Experience, that after all, THERE IS NOTHING GOOD IN POWER BUT POWER TO DO GOOD.



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